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Despite an enormous growth in strategic technology alliances the theoretical and 
empirical discussion has been slow in providing an integrated and coherent 
framework on alliance termination. Strategic alliances have been defined as inherently 
instable, i.e. often involving unplanned and premature termination by partnering 
firms. The paper examines whether this characteristic holds in the case the strategic 
technology alliances which are considered as new organizational forms. It concludes 
that failure rates are rather high for strategic technology alliances, but this seems not 
to deter firms to establish new strategic technology alliances even with the same 
parterning firm. 
  21 Introduction 
 
Since the 1980s, the strong growth of strategic technology alliances has dramatically 
changed the competitive landscape. Strategic technology alliances have become a key 
competitive weapon for companies contending in an increasingly hostile international 
environment. It allows them to efficiently leverage their resources, to participate in 
emerging cutting-edge technologies and to strategically re-position themselves in 
different market segments. By allying with competent technology partners firms are 
able to share risks and costs associated with technological development. At the same 
time, they are able to reduce time-to-market because of complementarities in skills 
and technologies among alliance partners. It has often been argued that the flexibility 
and adaptability of these alliances makes them a perfect substitute to more 
conventional modes of organization such as mergers and acquisitions and internal 
development (Dyer, 2000; Duysters & de Man, 2005).  However, in spite of these 
noted advantages of strategic technology alliances, empirical studies have shown that 
termination rate of strategic alliances is somewhere between 40 to 70 percent   
(Duysters, Heimeriks, & Jurriens, 2003, for an overview of the literature see Duysters, 
Kok & Vaandrager, 1999).  
In the marketing, strategic management and technology management 
literature, there has been a long-standing debate on alliance termination and in 
particular on the issue how parent dissatisfaction can lead to alliance failure (Madhok 
and Tallman 1998). The early literature in the area emerging in the late 1970s and 
1980s considered strategic alliances as a more peripheral business activity and as 
second best option compared to stand-alone alternatives and mergers and acquisitions. 
It contended that the absence of strategic and operational fit between partnering firms 
  3was the primary determinant for the termination of an alliance (Harrigan 1986; 
Harrigan 1988). The focus in these studies has been on the argument that insufficient 
value was created in strategic alliances. A gradual shift in the theoretical analysis has 
emerged in the past years with researchers found that performance differentials 
among firms in terms of their strategic alliances arised from firm-level characteristics. 
(Spekman, Forbes et al. 1998; Spekman and Isabella 2000). With the emergence of 
strategic technology alliances as a new business phenomenon, the theoretical 
discussion began to consider these new forms of strategic alliances as belonging to 
core business activities of companies and as a means of quasi-external acquisition of 
technology in particular in high technology industries (Duysters and Sadowski 1999; 
Hagedoorn and Duysters 2002). The theoretical analysis increasingly began to focus 
on the link between technological capabilities of parent companies and the strategic 
technology alliance (Reuer and Zollo 2005; Vanhaverbeke, Duysters et al. 2005). In 
spite of the theoretical development, the literature has rarely examined whether (or 
not) parent dissatisfaction has been due to firm-level technological capablities in 
terminating existing strategic technology alliances.  
Given the growing number of strategic alliances and the strategic importance 
of these alternative organizational modes questions surrounding alliance termination 
and failure have become more important than ever. The current debate on alliance 
termination has been embedded in the ongoing discussion of appropriate performance 
measures of strategic alliances. As Gulati (1998) stated these performance measures 
still consider a obstacle in research on strategic alliances.  A variety of measurements 
have been utilized to characterize alliance termination ranging from relative 
contributions of partners to (e.g. financial and operational) alliance assessment to 
more intangible performance measures. It has furthermore been suggested alliance 
  4termination could be even something desirable which is inherent to strategic alliances 
(Reuer and Zollo 2005). In this study we aim to shed more light on the specific causes 
of termination in the case of strategic technology alliances. In order to examine 
termination of strategic technology alliances, we characterize termination of a 
strategic technology alliances can either be 1) deliberately planned, pointing to a 
successful ending of an alliance, or 2) associated with an unintended termination, 
which is generally associated with failure. This dichotomy allows us to exclude 
alliance termination which has been intended and has been considered as desirable by 
the parties involved. In the paper, our focus is on strategic technology alliances, i.e. 
cooperative ventures in which the development of technology has been a strategic 
objective at least of one partner. This definition excludes short term inter-firm 
agreements as well as more conventional (e.g. marketing) alliances. It allows us to 
focus on the importance of the technological component in the evolution of these 
ventures.  
In the following, we characterize the discussion on alliance termination rates 
and their measurement in the light of current trends in strategic technology alliance 
activity. We then examine the theoretical discussion on alliance termination and 
develop a conceptual model that is related to parent dissatisfaction due insufficient 
managerial skills and competencies in coordinating and stabilizing existing alliances. 
This conceptual model is afterwards used to examine a sample of 48 strategic 
technology alliances. We finish the paper by summarizing our argument and drawing 
some conclusions with respect to preventing unintended termination of strategic 
technology alliances 
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2.   The Termination of Strategic Technology Alliances: Paradoxes and 
Mismatches 
 
Quite paradoxically, we have been witnessing an enormous growth in terms of the 
number of strategic technology alliances since the 1970s despite of an ongoing 
discussion of high failure rates for strategic alliances in the theoretical and business 
literature. As the data show (see Figure 1), there has been a vast increase in the 
number of strategic technology alliances since the late 1970s and, in particular, in the 
early 1980s. Despite some decline in the early 1990s, the growth of strategic 
technology alliances has been continuous and seemed unaffected by fluctuations in 
the world economy. It has been argued that these growth patterns will persist in the 
near future (Baum et al., 2000; Ernst et al. 2001; Duysters & de Man 2005). 
 
---------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about  here 
---------------- 
In spite of the potential advantages of strategic alliances, the empirical evidence on 
failure rates has painted a rather dark picture. 
 
‘Let the potential alliance partner beware: all is not as it seems. It is true that one can 
leverage resources, jump-start technology and facilitate market development. It is 
also true that one can learn a great deal from one’s partner in a shorter time than it 
would have taken to develop that particular skill set or tacit technology internally. 
  6The espoused gains are many and well documented. The data, however, paint a 
different and more somber picture’  (quoted from Spekman et al., 1996).  
 
In other words, the striking paradox is that companies continue to engage in strategic 
alliances despite rates of failure are quite high. This poses some awkward questions as 
to what kind of skills and competencies of managers involved in strategic technology 
alliances are necessary to prevent an unintended termination of the alliance: For 
example, are these manager aware about the current rates of unintended termination 
of strategic alliances; to what extent do skills and competence levels within an 
alliance differ in the stabilization and coordination phase of a strategic alliance?  
 
3   Termination of Strategic Technology Alliances: Failure Rates 
 
The literature on alliance termination has generated a mixed bag of findings. 
However, the general picture has been rather somber. For example, Spekman et al. 
(1996) proposed that the failure rate of strategic alliances has been at around 60 
percent. In the literature, this high failure rate has been used as a benchmark to 
characterize alliance termination (see Kok & Wildeman 1997; Dacin et al., 1997). 
More optimistic studies have postulated that only half of all strategic alliances fail 
(Brouthers et al. 1997, Douma 1994, Bleeke & Ernst 1993). Or as Pekar and Allio 
(1994) have pointed out that this rate might even still be lower. In their study they 
concluded that only 40 percent of the firms surveyed judged their strategic alliance 
experiences as a failure. Interestingly, distinctions between strategic technology 
alliances and other forms (e.g. marketing) alliances have rarely been made in this 
literature.   
  7In linking the experiences with strategic alliances to the literature on corporate 
growth, Lorange and Roos (1993) have argued that academic authors tend to 
overemphasize the problems of strategic alliances. They content that there is no hard 
evidence that the failure rates of alliances exceed the normal level of corporate failure 
of comparative single-owner ventures. If consumers do not accept a new product or 
service in the market, the activity is seen as a failure no matter if it was introduced by 
single-owner venture or a strategic alliance. In general, it can safely be assumed that 
the percentage of strategic alliances that fail is about 50 to 60 percent, which is a rate 
between the optimistic and pessimistic predictions. From the limited evidence 
available it seems that failure rates for strategic technology alliances are on the higher 
end of the scale. We conclude that the variation in failure rates can not only be 
attributed to different performance measures used (Park and Ungson 2001), but also 
to the different forms of alliances investigated  in the studies. 
 
3.1 The Problem of Achieving Sufficient Performance in Strategic Technology 
Alliances 
 
Gulati (1998) has argued that the performance of strategic alliances has received less 
attention compared to other areas in management theory because of some onerous 
research obstacles, which include measuring strategic alliance performance and the 
challenges of collecting data necessary to assess these issues in greater detail. It seems 
rather strange that not much attention has been devoted to strategic alliance 
performance,
 especially because of the startling observations on alliance failure.   
Park and Ungson (2001) even concluded that there currently is no systematic 
and comprehensive framework of strategic alliance failure due different 
  8interpretations (measures) of alliance failure and the lack of cross-fertilization 
between different theoretical approaches in the area. In their survey of the literature 
on performance measures of strategic alliance termination, they found that empirical 
studies have focused at the alliance level on measures such as survival (or stability), 
duration, financial performance or different subjetive or corporate indices. On the 
partner level, the focus has been on the achievement of individual goals and learning 
(Park and Ungson 2001). They conclude that there is an emerging preference of 
dissolution as the appropriate measure of alliance instability and that  instability of a 
strategic alliance may be signalled by an unexpected termination (Park and Ungson 
2001). In our analysis we asked managers who have personally been involved in a 
strategic technology alliance to characterize if the alliance was terminated 
unexpectedly. They had to answer the question “Was the termination unintended 
because the goals were not achieved?". Afterwards a number of questions were asked 
related to reasons for termination with respect to the alliance itself and the partner 
level. (see Appendix 1 for detailed questionnaire). In the following we discuss some 
of these reasons for alliance termination as found in the literature.  
 
3.2. Reasons for Strategic Alliance Termination 
 
Since the 1980s, a growing number of studies has dealt with the issue of termination 
of strategic alliances with only a few focusing on strategic technology alliances. An 
overview over these mostly empirical studies shows some interesting commonalities 
with respect to the analysis of reasons for alliance failure. First, a shift in the 
theoretical analysis from more static approaches towards a more process oriented 
perspective on alliance termination. Second, an emerging interest in examining the 
  9technology component underlying termination. Table1 provides an overview of the 
literature, taking on a dyadic point of view on strategic alliances. Traditionally, the 
alliance performance literature has focused on partner fit. Partner fit is often 
operationalized in terms of strategic fit, operational fit, technological fit or cultural fit.  
In focusing on the strategic fit, Niederkofler (1991), for example, postulated that joint 
goals should be set by top management to create compatible interests and 
complementary resources which form the fundamental basis for satisfactory 
performance of the alliance. By the selection of the (right) partner, firms should not 
rely on 'love at first sight'. Short-run alliance strategies and single partner alliances do 
not present a realistic starting point for the selection of suitable partners. Flexible and 
experienced management of a strategic alliance is during the whole evolution of the 
alliance essential for the partnership to be successful. Most reasons for strategic 
alliance failure have their origin in a badly managed partnership in which no trust and 
goodwill is created between the partners involved. Different management styles can 
be due to differences in corporate and national culture. Cultural differences should not 
be neglected as they can lead to unnecessary failure. An important factor that 
influences success and failure of strategic alliances is control and ownership. The 
analysis in Table 1 shows the importance of 'partner and partnership', 'strong-weak 
and weak-weak partnerships', 'trust', and 'culture' as reasons for failure (Duysters, de 
Kok & Vaandrager, 1999). Recent studies on strategic technology alliances have 
emphasized the importance of firm-specific capabilities (for an overview, see 
Heimeriks and Duysters, 2005). Authors have pointed at the importance of various 
micro-level mechanisms such as functions (e.g. alliance department), tools (e.g. 
alliance training), control and management processes (e.g. alliance metrics) and 
  10external parties (e.g. use of external consultants) that can play a significant role in 
alliance success (Dyer et al, 2001; Lambe et al, 2002). 
 
---------------- 




Alliances and innovation 
 
Alliance failure of technology alliances has also been described from a number of 
theoretical perspectives (see Duysters and Kumar, 2005). From a learning perspective, 
termination of an alliance has been attributed to the problem that one or more of the 
alliance partners either lacked the motivation and/or the ability to learn (Hamel, 
1991).  As the existence of superior learning capability of one partner can lead to a 
better appropriation of results of an alliance, the company might be satisfied with the 
outcome of the alliance and terminate it prematurely (Inkpen and Beamish 1997). 
There might also be an option in which the other partner in an alliance might be 
discarded after the relevant technology has been absorbed by the partner with superior 
learning capability (Hamel 1991).  Also the issue of absorptive capacity has achieved 
prominent attention in the literature (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Firms that do not 
have sufficient capabilities to absorb the knowledge of their partners will be likely to 
fail. Alliances are most effective when there is common basic knowledge (sufficient 
absorptive capacity) and differentiated specialized know-how. Moreover, companies 
  11can only successfully tap into other companies’ technology base if they have 
sufficient absorptive capacity (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998). In its turn, absorptive 
capacity results from investments in internal technological know-how. Hence, internal 
technological knowledge and external technology acquisition via alliances are 
considered complements. 
From an alliance capability tradition, it has been proposed that alliance 
survival depends on the parent company capability to manage a strategic alliance 
(e.g., Draulans, DeMan & Volberda, 2003; Duysters & Heimeriks, 2002; Ireland, Hitt, 
& Vaidyanath, 2002). In this context, alliance capability has been defined as a set of 
organizational mechanisms that are used by partnering firms to develop a set of 
routines for managing alliances (Kale, Dyer, & Singh, 2002). The organizational 
mechanisms have been linked to the use of  alliance training, the use of an alliance 
specialist and/or the use of an alliance evaluation mechanism (Draulans, DeMan & 
Volberda, 2003). Given that companies can utilize these alliance capabilities, the 
chances of success of strategic alliance are higher. Conversely, given that these 
alliance capabilities are less developed, the chances of termination increase. These  
alliance capabilities consists of different components such as control and management 
processes or the use of external parties that increase the chances of success of a 
strategic alliance. Increasingly these alliance capabilities have been linked to the 
innovation process within companies, i.e. processes of exploration and exploitation of 
new knowledge and in particular to their innovation performance.   
In a review of the more recent empirical literature on the effect of strategic 
alliances on innovative performance of companies de Man and Duysters (2005) found 
that 73 percent of the quantitative empirical studies on alliances found a positive 
relationship between the use of strategic alliances and innovative performance. Only 
  1210 percent of the studies reported a negative significant effect. This provides a much 
more optimistic view of the performance results of alliances than the grim picture that 
is displayed in the alliance literature in general. 
The use of success measures used in these studies varied from input measures 
(R&D expenditures), to output measures such as patents, patent citations and new 
product announcements. There seems to be however a very high correlation among 
these measures (Draulans, De Man and Volberda, 2003; Hagedoorn and Cloodt, 2003) 
Two observations stand out from this review. First, alliance capabilities of 
companies enables them to significantly increase alliance success (Anand and 
Khanna, 2000; Gray, Lindblad and Rudolph, 2001; Powell, Koput and Smith-Doerr, 
1996; Takeishi, 2001). Second, firms that have sufficient absorptive capacity and 
overlapping knowledge bases outperform alliances in which shared knowledge bases 
are lacking (Chan et al., 1997; Koh and Venkatraman, 1991; Lane and Lubatkin, 
1998; Mowery, Oxley and Silverman, 1996). 
Another conclusion that can be drawn from the empirical literature is that 
more intensive cooperation modes have a more positive impact on innovation then 
looser forms of cooperation such as licensing agreements (Anand and Khanna, 2000; 
Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 1994; Dyer, 1996, 2000). Furthermore, it has been 
found that the network level perspective is also an important determinant for alliance 
success. Some network positioning strategies prove to be more successful then others 
(Powell, Koput and Smith-Doerr, 1996; Rowley, Behrens and Krackhardt, 2000).  
There have been a number of attempts to consolidate the different theoretical 
traditions and provide a more coherent framework for analysing termination of 
strategic alliances (Yan 1998; Yan and Zang 1999; Das and Teng 2000; Park and 
Ungson 2001). The different approaches have shared the assumption that strategic 
  13alliances are inherently instable, i.e. they involve major structural changes and 
dissolutions that are unplanned and premature from one of the partner's perspectives 
(Inkpen and Beamish 1997). Structural instability has been related to unexpected 
(external) contingencies of a strategic alliance (Yan 1998), inter-firm rivalry and 
coordination of (increasing) complexity within an alliance (Park and Ungson 2001).  
The structural instability perspective on strategic allianes has some intuitive appeal as 
it attempts to integrate different theoretical traditions while providing some common 
ground in the area of strategic alliance termination. However, as strategic technology 
alliances are a new and a relatively stable organisational phenomenon in themselves, 
their sources of instability seem to differ from more traditional strategic alliances 
(Hagedoorn and Sadowski 1999; Douma, Bilderbeek et al. 2001). 
In our conceptual framework, we approached the termination of strategic 
technology alliances by utilizing these three levels of instability related to unexpected 
(external) contingencies, inter-firm rivalry and problems of coordination of 
(increasing) complexity within an alliance. We characterized unexpected external 
contigencies as the degree to which companies were able to alter the configuration of 
the alliance to fit to the changing environment. Problems of alignment to external 
conditions such as changes in the technological or commerical environment can cause 
termination of a strategic technology alliance as these changes might not be 
anticipated at the establishment of an alliance. 
With respect to inter-firm rivalry (i.e. the dynamics within the strategies and 
priorities of partnering firms), we related the success (or failure) of a strategic alliance 
to the process of collective alignment, i.e. to the (in-) effective and (in-) efficient 
alignment (i.e. fit) between the partners involved. As in strategic alliances partnering 
firms remain independent (in contrast to merger and acquisitions), the balance of the 
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strategic alliances is related to concepts such as complementary balance, mutual 
benefits, harmony and dependency (Douma, Bilderbeek et al. 2001).  In order to 
examine the extent to which parent dissatisfaction can led to the termination of a 
strategic technology alliance, we utilize the distinction between organizational and 
technological fit. As organizational fit characterizes the extent to which a strategic 
alliance can rely on existing firm-specific capabilities and competencies (Douma, 
Bilderbeek et al. 2001), technological fit defines the level of compatibility between 
the knowledge bases of cooperating partners in a strategic alliance. Lack of 
organizational fit increases the chance that the alliance becomes terminated without 
providing alliance partners with the expected gains. The availability of alliance 
capabilities and competencies within the parterning firms such as management and 
communication skills can improve organizational fit. Similarly, a lack of 
technological fit can lead to unintended termination of the alliance. With divergent 
knowledge bases, the chance that both partners appropriate equal benefits from a 
strategic technology alliance diminishes, increasing the probability of alliance failure. 
In order to characterize the skills of managing the complexity of the alliance, 
we focused on the contributions of parterning firms to the strategic alliance. As firms 
involved in a strategic alliance differ with respect to market positioning, 
organizational structure or management style, a "balanced" and continuous 
contribution of alliance partners to the alliance is necessary. This contribution is 
rooted in the firm strategy and requires commitment, financial capabilities and trust. 
Unequal contributions increase the change of unintended termination of a strategic 
alliance. In our study we related success (or failure) of a strategic alliance to the 
degree to which the underlying objectives of the companies for the alliance were (not) 
  15achieved. If the objectives of the partnering firms were not achieved, the termination 
of the alliance was unintended, i.e.resulted in a failure.  
 
4. Methodology and dataset 
4.1. Selection criteria an description  
The dataset contains 48 strategic technology alliances in the industries in which the 
development of new technologies has been important e.g. information technology and 
software.  Table 2 shows the distribution of strategic alliances according to the 
different industrial sectors.  
----- 




The data were collected based on a standardized questionnaire, which asked 
participants apart from firm and industry-specific information, detailed questions on 
the specific alliance. The interviews were undertaken face to face. Some filled-in 
questionnaires were send back after the interviews, but the different questions were at 
least explained. There were two major criteria for selecting appropriate interviewees: 
Firstly, they had to be personally involved in the formation of a specific strategic 
technology alliance at the strategic management level. Secondly, the alliance in 
question needed to be terminated. During the search procedure, we had to 
acknowledge that these two criteria were rather difficult to fulfill due to a number of 
firm internal and external factors such as job changes or promotion. In order to gather 
  16the relevant information we extensively used trade fairs in the area of new 
technologies to establish initial contacts with managers and undertake the interviews.   
The selected interviewees provided detailed information on 48 alliances. In the 
sample, 43 alliances (89.5 percent) were established in order to achieve technological 
goals. Four did not state these goals explicitly, and for two alliances we did not 
receive the appropriate information. The majority of these technology-oriented 
alliances also followed commercial goals (37 firms or 77 percent). 
A typical strategic alliance in the sample would have the following 
characteristics: Two international partnering firms did engage in an strategic alliance 
that had explicit technological and commercial goals where different reasons related 
to the structure and evolution of the alliance as well as to strategies of the partnering 
firms would lead to the termination of the alliance even if its goals were not achieved 
(For the detailed questions in the questionnaire, see Annex 1).  For example, in the 
case of DAF and Renault the commercial and technological goals were related to the 
joint development of a van for which a 50/50 percent joint venture that was 
established in 1990 and lasted for three years. The joint venture was terminated 
because the cost of maintaining the venture became too high and there was a lack of 
financial capabilities to further sustain the venture. But more importantly the priorities 
of the firms engaged in the venture changed.  
4.2. Reasons for strategic alliance failure 
In our sample, the failure rate was rather high. For 38 alliances the termination was 
unintended because they did not achieve the intended goals (failure rate: 79 percent). 
Just nine alliances were terminated because the intended goals were achieved. For 
four alliances no information was provided. This is in line with research on strategic 
  17alliances and innovation which has demonstrated that failure rates for strategic 
technology alliances are slightly higher than for more traditional (strategic) alliances .   
A possible explanation for the high failure rate can be related to the prominent 
presence of international alliances in the sample whereby in 29 cases the partnering 
firms had different (and in only seven cases similar) nationalities. For two alliances no 
information was provided on the country of origin of the partnering firms.  
In general, we attained the following distribution of reasons for unintended 
termination in our sample (see Table 3).  
---------------- 
Insert Table 3  about  here 
---------------- 
As expected a primary reason for terminating the alliance prematurely was related to   
the fact that the alliance did not achieve the expected performance. In 25 cases 
managers indicated as reason for terminating the alliance that the alliance did not 
generate the expected commercial results. For example, in the case of a research and 
development (R&D) agreement established in 1993 by Card Services International 
with a Japanese partnering firm that was aimed at developing an interface for a 
payment system. The agreement was terminated after three years because - as 
indicated in the questionnaire - it was difficult to adapt it to the changed commercial 
conditions and to generate the expected commercial results. 
We then examined the extent of organizational and technological fit.  As has 
been suggested in the literature, the most desirable alliance arrangement has with 
partners that are approximately equivalent in terms of size, country of origin, industry, 
and costs structure. In order to analyze these factors, we focused on issues such as 
  18organizational and technological fit as well as financial capabilities of the partnering 
firms. In our sample, managers indicated that from the perspective of their company 
the following reasons were responsible for the alliance failure (see Table 4). 
---------------- 
Insert Table 4 about  here 
---------------- 
 
By looking at the results from our sample, we did not find that lack of technological 
and organizational fit as well as financial capabilities have been major reasons for 
managers to terminate the alliance. These results received further support from Table 
3, in which the issue of 'high costs of maintaining the alliance' was not considered by 
managers as a major reason for the termination of the alliance.  
In other words, the reasons for the termination of the alliance from the 
company’s perspective varied widely. In the joint venture between Ericsson and 
Ascom, for example, established in 1984 and aimed at introducing SDH (synchronous 
digital hierarchy) in switching equipment, the adaptation of the alliance to a changing 
market environment was considered as a main reason for the termination of the 
venture. In the joint venture between Siemens and SMH of Switzerland established in 
1995 and aimed at producing a high fashionable consumer telecommunication goods 
the reasons for the termination were linked to problems in the adaptation of the 
venture to changing market conditions, but also to the lack of finance and the lack of 
communication within the alliance. .  
Another problem area in alliance failure has been related to changes in the 
external environment. In the questionnaire, we examined reasons related to changes in 
  19the market and technological environment. Our results showed that these reasons have 
not been as important for the termination of the strategic alliances as assumed in the 
literature (see Table 5).  
 
---------------- 
Insert Table 5 about  here 
---------------- 
 
In general, we can conclude that reasons for failure of strategic technology alliances 
have in particular been linked to the commercial motivations of the partnering firms. 
This included problems in adaptation of the alliance to changing commercial 
conditions or an unsatisfactory level of commercial results generated by the alliance. 
One surprising result was that despite a variety of reasons for alliance termination, the 
majority of respondents indicated that they would again engage in an alliance with the 
partner in the future.   
   
5.  Summary and Conclusions  
 
The growth in strategic technology alliances since the 1970s has been accompanied 
by intense discussion on failure rates without having let to a more coherent approach 
towards alliance termination. The different theoretical traditions in the alliance area 
are still very much dispersed ranging from learning based to transaction costs 
accounts, which evolved to include more process explanations and included more 
recently also alliance-capability explanations. The common denomintor in this 
  20literature has been that strategic alliances are inherently instable, i.e. that alliance 
termination are often unplanned and premature from the partner's perspective. 
However, this instablity characteristic has critically been examined in the literature 
with respect to strategic technology alliances as these alliance forms seem to represent 
a more stable organizational form. With our framework, we accounted for different 
levels (external contingencies, inter-firm rivalry and managerial complexity) at which 
instability in strategic alliances could be originated.  
In our study we found a failure rate which has been considerably higher than 
the failure rates reported in the existing literature. We attributed this to the fact that 
the alliances under study were international by nature. However, the extent to which 
the (different) nationalities of partnering firms, for example in international joint 
ventures increases the chances of alliance failure requires some further analysis.   
Furthermore, the strategic alliances examined had a technical component and have 
been industries characterized by a faster rate of technological change than normally 
observed in slower moving industrial sectors. In these industries, the evolution and 
stability of strategic alliances is governed by other mechanisms compared to 
traditional sectors as knowledge generation and sharing is central to their 
establishment. Other mechanisms leading to the establishment (and termination) of 
strategic technology alliances are becoming important such as exploring and 
exploiting new technologies.  
Overall, we found that reasons for strategic alliance failure have in particular 
been related to the various commercial motivations of partnering firms. Firms were 
dissatisfied by their (and their partner’s) ability to adapt to changing conditions and 
the lack of a satisfactory level of commercial results as generated by the alliance. 
Surprisingly the majority of respondents were willing to engage in future strategic 
  21alliances with the (initial) partnering firms in the failed alliance in the future. We 
would explain this (apparent) paradox by characterizing the establishment and 
evolution of strategic alliances as one (of the many) projects strategic management is 
actually pursuing. Therefore the unsuccessful termination alliances seems well to be 
considered by mangers as an failed project but not as a (systemic) failure of the 
partnering firm. However, this phenomenon definitely should receive some more 
attention in the future.  
   We are aware that due to the sample size and the variety of firms involved in 
the questionnaire, our results can only be considered as tentative and indicative. 
However, as our results support a number of intuitive conclusions from the literature, 
we consider them as a first and initial step towards further more in-depth analysis on 
alliance failure.  
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Figure 1: Number of newly established strategic alliances per year (1985-2000), 
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                   ⊗ 
Lorange & Ross           ⊗    ⊗  ⊗    ⊗  ⊗ 
Brouthers et al.   ⊗                      
Schuler et al   ⊗                  ⊗  ⊗ 
Chevalier     ⊗  ⊗  ⊗  ⊗    ⊗    ⊗       ⊗ 
Wildeman & Kok               ⊗    ⊗  ⊗  ⊗ 
Stafford             ⊗  ⊗    ⊗  ⊗   
Douma             ⊗  ⊗    ⊗    ⊗ 
Maljers              ⊗  ⊗  ⊗  ⊗  ⊗ 
Adarkar                       ⊗ 
Bleeke & Ernst                 ⊗  ⊗  ⊗   
Niederkofler    ⊗  ⊗    ⊗  ⊗  ⊗        ⊗   
Khanna et al.                   ⊗  ⊗  ⊗ 
Medeof                    ⊗  ⊗ 
Dacin & Hitt                   ⊗  ⊗  ⊗ 
Kanter                      ⊗ 
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Table 1: Reasons for Strategic Alliance Termination 
(Source: various articles are combined, see authors) 
Note: authors should have analyzed a reason for failure in order to be added to the table. Authors who only have mentioned some failure reasons are not taken into account in this comparison. 
 
  
Table 2: Distribution of Strategic Alliances According to Industrial Sectors 
 




17-19 Textiles  5  6 
23, 24  Petrols and Chemicals  6  8 
30 -33   Electronics e.g. Telecom  10  13 
34, 35   Cars e.g. automotive  2  3 
72   Computer and related activities e.g. 
software 
10 12 
92, 93  Information Technology  5  6 
Total     38  48 
 
  29Table 3: Reasons for unintended termination  
 
Reasons for unintended 
termination of alliance 
Was a reason  Was not a 
reason 
No answer  Total 
Difficulties to generate the 






Alliance did not generate the 






Problems related to 







Management of the alliance 






















  30Table 4: Reasons for termination according to company perspective 
Your own company's 
perspective on the alliance 
failure      
Was a reason  Was not a reason  No answer  Total 




































Lack of trust on your side 
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Table 5: Reasons for termination based in the broader environment 
 
Changes in broader 
environment causing 
termination 
Was a reason  Was not a  
reason 
No answer  Total 
Changes in technological 
environment effected 
termination.  
14 24  0  38 
Changes in relevant 
markets caused 
termination.    
14 23  1  38 
Cultural backgrounds of 
partners effected 
termination?  
14 20  4  38 
Would you consider 
cooperating with the 
partner(s) in the future?
  
22 13  3  38 
  
  32Annex 1: Questionnaire on Termination of Strategic Alliances 
 
General Information on the Firm: 
Name of partners       
Address of firm     
Form of co-operation  
Field of technology/industry  
Starting date of co-operation 
 for joint venture equity distribution in %  
 
General Information on the Alliance 
Is the alliance still existing?              
When  was  the  alliance  terminated?       
Was the termination planned because goals were achieved?    
Was the termination unintended because goals were not achieved?  
 
Planned termination of the alliance 
Did both partners appropriate the results of co-operation?     
Did your company appropriate the results of co-operation?     
Did your partner(s) appropriate the results of co-operation?    
Do you expect future co-operation with the same partner?     
 
Reasons for unintended termination of alliance 
Difficulties to adapt the alliance to technological conditions.    
Difficulties to generate the expected technological results.     
Difficulties to adapt alliance to commercial conditions.    
Alliance did not generate the expected commercial results.     
Organisational problems within  the  alliance.      
Problems related to communication within the alliance.     
Management of the alliance became too complex.       
High costs of maintaining the alliance.         
Goals of the alliance remained unclear.         
  33 
Your own company's perspective on the alliance failure 
Lack of technological f i t               
Lack  of  organisational  fit        
Lack  of  financial  capabilities        
Lack  of  commitment         
Change in your priorities and strategy         
Lack of trust on your side             
A  threat  to  your  core  competences       
 
Changes in broader environment 
Did changes in the broader environment affect termination?    
Was termination caused by changes in technological environment?    
Was termination caused by changes in relevant markets?     
Did cultural backgrounds of partner companies affect termination?  
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